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The Strategic Constitution: Understanding 
Canadian Power in the World by Irvin 
Studin1
STEPHEN PAUL HAIGH2
AS IRVIN STUDIN BEGAN SCOURING the Constitution Act, 1867, he discovered 
a “somewhat shocking”3 statement buried in the preamble to our founding 
document. Federation, he learned, would “conduce to the Welfare of the 
Provinces and promote the Interests of the British Empire.”4 Jurisdictionally, 
this “most underserviced line in the entire Canadian constitutional framework”5 
seemed prima facie to Studin to suggest that Canadian foreign policy—and 
national high strategy more generally—belonged to Westminster, not Ottawa.
Is this true? Must whatever Canada seeks to accomplish in the wider world 
“reckon with the original ‘colonial’ and ‘tactical’ iron constitutional cage that 
arguably has dictated much of the country’s logic over the past century and a 
half?”6 After close and detailed readings of the Constitution Act, 1867, the Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, and associated statutes and case law, Studin comes down 
firmly, if unsurprisingly, on the side of Canadian domestic legal, political, and 
thus strategic agency:
1. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014). 
2. BA (Calgary); MA (Calgary); PhD (Dunedin).
3. Supra note 1 at ix.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid at x.
6. Ibid.
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Canada has a Strategic Constitution [which], despite its manifestly astrategic 
conception, and despite a correspondingly weak tradition of strategically sensitive 
constitutional jurisprudence, can be employed with great flexibility by the federal 
government ... to project considerable power to advance national strategic ends and 
purposes.7 
To students of international relations (IR), this observation appears 
somewhat trite. Surely it is in the very nature of sovereignty that the state, having, 
as is famously said, no equals inside and no superiors outside, is master of its own 
house? Surely national security and foreign policy are exclusive prerogatives of the 
Canadian government?
Without naming it, Studin hits upon a fundamental tension between liberty 
and power. Indeed, his exploration of state power vis-à-vis the Constitution brings 
into stark relief an issue of overarching importance to constitutional government, 
and inasmuch as Studin has cast light on the underpinnings of that relationship 
in the Canadian context, he has performed a valuable service. As such, before 
addressing the tension, it would seem worthwhile to summarize how he goes 
about his task.
The book is divided into two parts. In Part I, Studin develops a conceptual 
framework in which he outlines the notion of strategic power as it pertains to 
the Constitution, and then—paying particular attention to the means by and 
extent to which they are available to the Canadian government in pursuit of 
strategic ends—undertakes a detailed and comprehensive audit of the key factors 
and instruments of strategic power. Part II consists of four case studies: Canadian 
strategic leadership in Central and South America and the Caribbean; bona fide 
war; Arctic sovereignty; and post-9/11 counterterrorism policy.8
Part I forms the conceptual backbone of the book. At stake here is the 
degree to which the Constitution empowers the Canadian state across each of 
the essential strategic tools, or factors, that the author deems relevant. Through 
nuanced discussions of constitutional, statutory, and case law, Studin traces the 
contours of strategic license granted either explicitly or by implication to the 
federal government in respect of the following core elements of state power: 
the diplomatic and military aspects (according to Studin the two “cardinal 
7. Ibid at 103 [emphasis in original]. 
8. Part II, the case study section, ranges from the rather fanciful (leadership in the Americas) to 
the eminently real and actual (counterterrorism). Readers will find much to reflect upon, but 
time and space limitations conspire against any treatment here. Suffice it to say that Part I 
covers all of the conceptual bases: As regards constitutional implications, nothing in the case 
studies would come as a surprise to attentive readers of Part I.
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instruments” of national strategy9); “government, or pure executive potency”10; 
natural resources and food; national economic might; communications; and 
population. Each of these mechanisms merits a full chapter, and is given thorough 
treatment. With the exception of “government or pure executive potency,” all 
are uncontroversial aspects of state power. Indeed, IR scholars, or at least those 
of realist persuasion, would have no trouble endorsing the list. On the other 
hand, one might well object to Studin’s decision to bracket out geography on the 
ground that as a factor of power it is “excessively abstract.”11 The exclusion is as 
unusual as the claim. Along with sheer size, Canada’s geographical position (like 
the United States, it is the beneficiary of what John Mearsheimer famously calls 
the immense stopping power of water12) has probably done as much to influence 
and inform our foreign policy as anything else. As for abstraction, could there be 
anything more concrete than Canada’s colossal landmass?13
Disagreement over geography aside, the strong conclusion to be drawn from 
Studin’s analysis in Part I is that the federal government has almost unlimited 
marge de maneuvre when it comes to questions of core national interest. Factors 
that would otherwise place quite formidable constitutional restrictions on 
federal power—inter alia, significant provincial jurisdiction over a number of 
relevant policy areas, manifold Charter injunctions revolving around questions 
of fundamental human rights, and an array of title protections for, and duties 
relating to, Indigenous Canadians—turn out more or less to dissolve in what 
Studin, in this instance referring to supersession of Charter rights provisions, calls 
“a fairly potent cocktail of executive override.”14 On Studin’s reading, the closer we 
get to fundamental issues of national security, the more the Constitution bends 
itself to the will of the state. In times of great need this becomes a sort of strategic 
imperative, and the author does an excellent job of showing how, in extremis, 
heavy constitutional artillery (primarily the Crown Prerogative; the Emergencies 
Act; Peace, Order, and Good Government (POGG) provisions; and the principle 
9. Supra note 1 at 29.
10. Ibid at 59. For more about this mechanism, see the commentary below.
11. Ibid at 55.
12. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2014) at 44, 264.
13. Studin also explicitly brackets out what Joseph Nye terms “soft power,” namely the 
ability to achieve desired outcomes based on signalling, demonstration, and/or example. 
This is unfortunate. A good deal of US history has been spent in a tug-of-war between 
‘interventionism’ and ‘exemplarism,’ and to ignore that heritage (and its relevance to the 
Canadian Constitution as a (shining?) example in its own right) is to shortchange the 
analysis. Or, again, the correct response to IR realists who exclude non-material power is that 
“ideas matter.”
14. Supra note 1 at 51.
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or doctrine of necessity) gets rolled out in the service of, say, potential threats 
to national survival. Indeed, Studin goes so far as to say that “extraordinary or 
even ordinarily ‘illegal’ measures”15 come firmly within the constitutional ambit: 
In particular, the doctrine of constitutional necessity underscores “the signal 
premise that the Canadian Constitution cannot, in the presence of exceptional 
circumstances or emergencies, properly or reasonably be viewed as a ‘death pact’, 
as it were, for the Canadian state and its citizens.”16 
Again, to an IR practitioner, this seems tautological. The international 
system of sovereign states is a harsh world. Individual members operate in a 
largely anarchic environment so that, although cooperation is possible and even 
necessary, the underlying logic of the system is one of self-help. States, in other 
words, must in the final analysis be supremely self-reliant, which is also to say 
that they must remain free of domestic constitutional constraint.
To sum up, when push comes to shove, the constitutional tail must not 
wag the state dog. In this regard, two criticisms spring to mind. First, in Studin’s 
typology, “government, or pure executive potency” is a “subsidiary”17 strategic 
element, or factor, of state power. For this reviewer at least, executive potency is 
neither subsidiary nor an element. Rather, executive power is precisely what we 
mean by the state: The state is constituted in and by its executive potency. To call 
that potency an element of state power is to commit a category error.
Second (and related) is the obvious tension between the rule of law as 
embodied in the Constitution, and the mechanisms of ‘pure’ state power that 
those same rules might jam or foul up. Studin is perhaps right to lament the 
dearth of Canadian scholarship in this area; certainly, he expresses his frustration 
at various points in the text. Referring specifically to the potential strategic value 
of communications, he notes: “Canadian jurisprudence ... nowhere invokes 
‘strategy’ (or, say, raison d’etat) ... .  [T]his is in keeping with the ‘astrategic’ 
constitutional jurisprudence tradition posited in this book.”18 Similarly, with 
respect to the power-projection capacity of our natural resources and food, he 
maintains that a lack of case law and of constitutional literature is “perhaps 
a measure of the absence of strategic tradition and ... strategic thinking ... in 
Canadian constitutional culture.”19 Or again, on population—this time referring 
to the strategic assertion of Arctic sovereignty, and the attendant need for a 
15. Ibid at 62.
16. Ibid at 49-50.
17. Ibid at 46.
18. Ibid at 83.
19. Ibid at 63.
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substantial (i.e., politically engineered) human presence in the Canadian north—
he notes that “there has been no jurisprudence ... to provide guidance ... . [A]s 
such, my analysis will have to be largely counterfactual.”20 
Studin’s book serves as a corrective, or at any rate the beginnings of one, 
even as the author appears to concede that the essence of the problem may be the 
Constitution itself. The latter, he frequently asserts, is “largely silent on strategy 
and strategic power”21: In “design”22 and “conception,”23 it is “astrategic.”24
Deriving a strategic constitution from an astrategic constitution seems 
suspiciously like squaring a circle, unless and until one accepts a key distinction 
between internal and external sovereignty. Oddly enough, Studin hovers over this 
notion in the Introduction, where he takes pains to note:
[C]onceptually speaking, the Constitution and strategy are but flip sides of the 
same Canadian enterprise (the Canadian state)—or at least the legitimacy of that 
enterprise. The Constitution, concerned as it is with law, is representative of the 
internal legitimacy of the Canadian state, while strategy, concerned as it is with 
power, is representative of the external legitimacy of the Canadian state.25 
He goes on to quote (with approval) Henry Kissinger, who clearly marks 
off a state’s “internal arrangements” as operating in the realm of justice, whereas 
a state’s chief external concern must always be “a projection of power that 
determines its ability to fulfill its minimum functions—that is, to protect its 
population from foreign dangers and domestic upheaval.”26 
In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville mused that in the conduct 
of their foreign relations, democracies seemed decidedly inferior to other 
governments.27 It is not too implausible to view the 19th and 20th centuries as a 
canvas upon which the United States tested Toqueville’s proposition, confirmed 
it, and reacted, however reluctantly and hypocritically, in perhaps the only way an 
aspirational and eventually truly great power could react. Had Studin trained his 
meticulous gaze on the foreign affairs of our southern neighbour, we would have 
a clearer picture of how the momentous tension between liberty and power has 
20. Ibid at 143.
21. Ibid at 16.
22. Ibid at 3.
23. Ibid at 46.
24. Ibid at 22.
25. Ibid at 4 [emphasis in original]. 
26. Ibid at 5.
27. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, translated by George Lawrence, ed by JP Mayer 
(New York: Anchor Doubleday, 1969) at 228-29, 694.
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played out in the index case of the world’s first truly constitutional democracy. 
More to the point, we might better appreciate how Canada—for Studin, another 
aspirational power in an age of increasing interdependence—should reconcile 
strategy and the rule of law as it acts to further its interests on the global stage.
A comparative study, then, would have highlighted the deeper issue. Now, 
tyrants and despots need not worry about constitutions; by definition they 
make them up (or not; it hardly matters) as they go along. Having such license 
confers upon tyrants certain advantages (and, not incidentally, gives Tocqueville’s 
observation its real force). In the context of a strategic Canadian constitution, 
it suggests that we should pay heed to the evolution of an American equivalent 
founded on acute experiential awareness of the dangers and opportunities 
associated with supreme executive power. Thus we might consider James Madison 
who, sensitive to the need for checks and balances in a republican system, moved 
that Congress reserve the power to declare war: For Madison, the President ought 
not receive exclusive power to make peace and war “because it would have meant 
‘throwing into his hands the influence of a monarch.’”28 And yet, from the turn 
of the following century and as American power grew, so too did its strategic 
objectives—at which point the calculus changed. John Adams led the country 
into war against France without a formal declaration; Thomas Jefferson employed 
a “loose construction of his executive powers”29 to purchase and govern Louisiana; 
and then in a volte face, Madison himself, “in the earliest analogue to the Gulf 
of Tonkin resolution,”30 extracted “vague powers” from Congress to subvert and 
then seize West Florida.31
What was going on? How, at the close of the 19th century, could William 
McKinley prosecute the Spanish-American War by further “[stretching] the 
constitutional restraints on his power until they assumed an entirely new 
shape?”32 The answer seems plain enough. Once a state begins to assert itself on 
the international stage, the scales start to tip. Woodrow Wilson argued that when 
domestic politics dominate, congressional power is and ought to be ascendant. 
But for Wilson, the Spanish-American War “‘changed the balance of the parts’, 
for diplomatic questions became paramount and ‘in them the President was 
28. Walter LaFeber, “The Constitution and United States Foreign Policy: An Interpretation” 
(1987) 74:3 J Am Hist, 695 at 697 (quoting Pierce Butler).
29. Ibid at 699.
30. Abraham D Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power: The Origins (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harper Collins, 1976) at 377.
31. Ibid.
32. LaFeber, supra note 27 at 704.
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by necessity leader.’”33 A quick empirical test is instructive: Up until 1930 the 
United States had concluded fully twenty-five treaties and only nine executive 
agreements; by 1972, those numbers, respectively, had risen to 947 and 4,359.34 
Walter LaFeber speaks of a centrifugal-centripetal effect in which, as military 
and economic power increasingly move outward, political power is centralized at 
home. Constitutionally speaking, the rule seems to be that when this happens, 
the usual rules cease to apply. One might say that once a constitution is put to 
high strategic purpose, it becomes in a real sense unconstitutional. Indirectly, 
Studin has revealed the ominous expediency of some of our most important laws.
33. Ibid at 708.
34. George W Ball, Diplomacy for a Crowded World: An American Foreign Policy (Boston: Little 
Brown, 1976) 208-09.
